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Abstract 
 This dissertation analyses the long-term behaviour of bank financial 
ratios from 1923 to 1933, focusing on a population of 193 Chicago state 
banks. These banks are divided into earlier and later failure cohorts. The 
main conclusion is that a turning point in banks’ vulnerability is identifiable 
before the first banking crises, between the end of 1928 and June 1930. A 
second, related conclusion is that this upsurge in vulnerability (as 
expressed by such variables as retained earnings and other real estate) is 
made even more significant when considering banks’ behaviour in the 
preceding decade. In almost all cases earlier failures behaved more riskily 
in the 1920s, which explains their earlier and higher vulnerability at the start 
of the depression. 
 
 
Introduction  
There are two main interpretations of the causes of the Great 
Depression in the US. The monetarist hypothesis focuses on banking 
crises. It posits that the first banking crisis (November 1930 to December 
1930) was wholly responsible for turning what was until then a normal 
recession (according to this interpretation) into a full-fledged Great 
Depression. This crisis, thus described primarily as one of liquidity, was 
autonomously generated; that is, it was generated by nothing other than 
mass withdrawals in a “contagion of fear,” in the words of Friedman and 
Schwartz. The Federal Reserve was partly responsible for not alleviating 
the system, and the great fall in the money supply led to the most 
catastrophic slump in US history. The second hypothesis is the “real 
effects” one. In its early form as introduced by Temin, it focused 
exclusively on fundamental variables and emphasized a fall in 
consumption and investment. New research along these lines has 
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focused on fundamental problems as reflected in the state of banks; 
according to this view, banks were insolvent, not illiquid. Proponents of 
this second interpretation conclude that banks that failed indeed 
previously showed particularly weak balance sheets, sometimes even 
before the Great Depression’s official start (October 1929). Many point out 
similarities between banks that failed in the 1920s as a result of the post-
war shock in agriculture and Great Depression failures. This new 
development is certainly welcome in the debate, but it pushes to the 
background an important question: if the “autonomous” fall in the money 
supply during the first banking crisis was not a turning point, and if banks 
were indeed in fundamental turmoil beforehand, when did a normal 
recession turn into a “Great Depression”? Is there a point at which banks’ 
portfolios took an unusually bad turn before the banking crises? My aim is 
to answer this question by focusing on the city of Chicago.  
I chose the city of Chicago for two main reasons. First, Chicago 
area banks suffered one of the highest failure rates in the US, especially 
in the summers of 1931 and 1932.1 Out of 193 state banks in June 1929, 
only 33 had survived up to June 1933. Even though Chicago’s first 
devastating crisis was in June 1931, it also suffered from the first the 
November-December 1930 panic.2 The other reason is that some of the 
best data on bank financial statements are available for Chicago state 
banks. State banks (as opposed to national banks) represented more than 
80 per cent of all suspended banks,3 and although many reports were 
issued in other states those for Illinois are particularly detailed.  
The dissertation analyzes the whole population of the 193 Chicago 
state banks present in June 1929, dividing them into two main groups: 
Great Depression survivors and failures. Failures are divided into four 
                                                     
1 It had the highest failure rate of any urban area (Guglielmo, forthcoming). 
2 By December 1930 in Chicago there were already 37 fewer state banks than in June 
1929, representing 19% of the total 193 banks. 
3 See below on White (1984). 
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cohorts: June 1931 failures, June 1932 failures, June 1933 failures and all 
depression failures. Mean variables such as return on equity, reserve-
deposit ratios and real estate loan shares are subject to comparison 
between the five cohorts. The aim for this thesis is to perform this 
comparison looking at 10-year time series, focusing on the evolution of 
survivors and failures from 1923 all the way up to 1933. Comparative 
research has already been conducted by other authors, but they all 
restricted themselves to mainly static comparisons at one or two points in 
time (often June 1929), without looking at long-term comparative trends. 
Division into cohorts, when performed, was also restricted to purely static 
analysis. 
The main conclusion is that failures start on a new trend well before 
the first really damaging crisis in Chicago in June 1931, and even before 
the Friedman-Schwartz first banking crisis (during which Chicago was 
relatively less affected than, for example, New York) – usually between 
June 1929 and June 1930. The second conclusion is that early failures 
(the June 1931 failure cohort) were even weaker than late failures over 
most of the preceding decade (from 1923 to June 1929). This second 
conclusion gives additional support and shape to the claim in the present 
literature that failures in general were weaker at least just before the Great 
Crash.  
Part 1 will give a substantial overview of the literature on the start of 
the Great Depression, which is extensive. In Part 2, the central part of the 
dissertation, I first focus on the evolution of financial ratios in the decade 
preceding the depression to determine the precise origin (both in time and 
in kind) of banks’ vulnerabilities. In particular, the excessive recklessness 
of (especially early) failures will stand out, specifically in terms of real 
estate and risky asset investment during most of the decade. Then I look 
at the Great Depression itself to determine whether changes in trends are 
detectable before December 1930. Given banks’ accumulated 
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weaknesses over the preceding decade, such changes can be seen as 
the first symptoms of considerable asset vulnerability. Finally, Part 3 is an 
attempt to explain why in the context of the Chicago business, 
construction and credit booms of the 1920s such weaknesses may have 
appeared and settled in. A conclusion will bring together these three parts.  
 
 
1. Overview of the Literature 
 That the literature on the US Great Depression is enormous is no 
overstatement. The first challenge for a researcher on the Great 
Depression is to say where his or her project slots into this literature. 
Hence the literature review below is long, but necessarily so. Debate on 
the causes of the Depression started from its very onset, and since then 
the Great Depression has remained, in the words of Bernanke, “the Holy 
Grail of macroeconomics” (Bernanke, 2000, p.5). This is not to say that 
progress has not been made, and indeed research has helped establish 
new irrefutable facts: for example, the idea that, contrary to what had 
been thought for almost 40 years, the first banking crisis (November – 
December 1930) was regional in character and confined mainly to the 
north-centre of the US and New York City. Nevertheless some of the most 
important controversies, which mainly took form in the 1960s, have not 
been resolved. Among them is perhaps the greatest debate about the 
Great Depression: the issue of monetary, as opposed to fundamental, 
causes of the slump. In this debate the main protagonists are easily 
identifiable: on the one hand, the monetarists, led by Friedman and 
Schwartz, argue that a large autonomous fall in the money supply was 
responsible for unusually aggravating the slump; on the other hand, their 
opponents emphasise more fundamental problems that the Federal 
Reserve itself would have had a hard time resolving.  
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 In the early form of the debate the question of the “precipitating 
factors” of the Depression was considered a crucial one. Most agreed that 
the starting point of the slump could be identified as the Wall Street Crash 
of October 1929. But most also agreed that although a decline in domestic 
product started at that point, it would not have led to the Depression as 
millions of Americans experienced it were it not for other factors. Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz in particular, in their Monetary History of the 
United States emphasised that a “dramatic change in character [emphasis 
added]” in the recession occurred around what they identified as the “first 
banking crisis” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 308). The primary cause 
of this first banking panic was contagion originating from a few bank 
failures in agricultural areas, a contagion which knew “no geographical 
limits” (ibid.). The special importance of the failure of Bank of United 
States in New York City on December 11, 1930 was highlighted, pointing 
to the disastrous psychological repercussions of such a notorious failure. 
Other “liquidity” crises followed the first one, notably in the summer of 
1931, after Britain left gold in September, and in March 1933. The Federal 
Reserve’s role was seen as crucial in this interpretation. Handicapped by 
the recent death of former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve found itself with no 
charismatic leader to manage operations and influence other Reserve 
Districts away from the Real Bills doctrine.4 Consequently, and partly also 
because of some confusion regarding the multiple roles of the Banks and 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Banks failed to reach consensus and 
often refused to expand the way the Bank of New York would have 
wanted. To alleviate the liquidity crises the Federal Reserve should have 
                                                     
4 The Real Bills doctrine was widely accepted among monetary policymakers from the 
inception of the Federal Reserve in 1913 up to and including the Great Depression. It 
stipulated that the economy followed natural cycles and that the Federal Reserve’s role 
was to follow these movements: if the economy expanded, the central bank should 
expand the money supply; if it contracted, it should contract. See Chandler, 1971, p.9. 
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expanded significantly; the fact that it did not (according to this view) was 
fatal for the US economy (see also Chandler, 1971, Wheelock, 1991).  
 Although the rises in the reserve-deposit and currency-deposit 
ratios were easily linked to the fall in the money supply through the money 
multiplier, the links between the latter and the fall in economic activity 
were less clear in Friedman and Schwartz’s work. Bernanke realised the 
existence of this gap and elaborated a more complex theory of the 
propagation of monetary policy, which went much further than the simple 
quantity theory of money. He demonstrated that banking crises and 
bankruptcies both increased what he called the cost of financial 
intermediation; in other words, liquidity crises made it harder for banks to 
lend and the debt crisis also increased borrowing costs through the 
erosion of collateral. It was these higher borrowing costs which led to a fall 
in aggregate demand (Bernanke, 1983). Despite the theorisation of these 
important channels of monetary policy, and despite Bernanke’s own 
awareness of the importance of bankruptcies for the erosion of collateral, 
he held on to the idea that it was first and foremost an “autonomous” 
liquidity crisis which led to a fall in the money supply: 
 
For banks, it might well be argued that not only are failures 
relatively independent of anticipations about output, but that 
they are not simply the product of current and past output 
performance either: First, banking crises had never previous 
to this time been a necessary result of declines in output. 
Second, Friedman and Schwartz, as well as other writers, 
have identified specific events that were important sources 
of bank runs during 1930-33. These include the revelation of 
scandal at the Bank of the United States [sic] (...); the 
collapse of the Kreditanstalt in Austria (...), Britain’s going off 
gold (...), and others, all connected very indirectly (if at all) 
with the path of industrial production in the United States 
(ibid., pp. 61-2). 
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He concluded by emphasising that the “financial crisis contained large 
exogenous components” (ibid., p.62), and indeed that “with the first 
banking crisis, there came what Friedman and Schwartz called a ‘change 
in the character of the contraction.’” He also clearly asserted that “by late 
1930, the downturn, although serious, was still comparable in magnitude 
to the recession of 1920-22; as the decline slowed, it would have been 
reasonable to expect a brisk recovery, just like in 1922” (ibid., p. 47).  
 When Temin wrote Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great 
Depression? (1976), he also had the question of the precipitating factors 
in mind: “We ask how events in 1930 differed from those in a short-term 
depression. Alternatively, what happened in 1930 that did not happen in, 
say, 1921 or 1938?” (Temin, 1976, p. 63). However, contrary to Friedman 
and Schwartz, and to Bernanke, he did not believe that a change in the 
character of the recession occurred in November 1930. He asserted that 
this change occurred slightly earlier in the year, and was linked to more 
fundamental changes in the economy than an autonomous liquidity crisis. 
Indeed, he attempted to demonstrate that what really caused a change in 
character of the Depression was an unusual fall in consumption, whose 
origin was yet to be determined. Unfortunately data on GNP, consumption 
and exports were only available on a yearly basis, and Temin could only 
compare year-to-year differences in those variables when he compared 
the Depression with the 1920-21 recession. He nevertheless established 
that although the change in GNP from 1928 to 1930 was almost equal to 
that between 1919 and 1921, the main difference was that consumption 
fell in 1930 while it significantly rose in 1921 (ibid., p. 65). He also noted 
that although the fall in investment was significant in both periods, the 
main component of the change in investment in 1930 was construction, as 
opposed to inventories for the earlier recession. He then conceded that 
the large fall in consumption in 1930 had “no satisfactory explanation”: 
that it may have been related to the fall in construction, to the stock-
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market crash (although he downplays this option) or to a sharp decline in 
farm income (ibid., p.83). Either way, he made a point of demonstrating 
that this fall occurred earlier than the first banking crisis; indeed he located 
a turning point around September 1930. To prove his point, he mainly 
referred to newspaper articles showing a mood change towards deep 
pessimism around that time (ibid., p. 79). 
 As for bank failures, Temin explicitly first regretted that (as he 
believed) no data were available on individual banks. Then, he pointed to 
an inconsistency in Friedman and Schwartz’s work:  they mention that 
“the great surge in bank failures that characterized the first banking crisis 
after October 1930 may possibly have resulted from poor loans and 
investments made in the twenties” and then do not discuss this possibility 
(ibid., p. 85, and Friedman and Schwartz, p. 355). He thus considered two 
separate causes of bank failures: either these banks had poor loans and 
investments, or they suffered from the agricultural distress. In the absence 
of any data on bank balance sheets, Temin’s proxy for bad loans became 
“previous suspensions” (1920s suspensions). His proxy for agricultural 
distress was chosen to be “cotton income” as reflecting geographical 
location. He concluded that previous suspensions were not the culprit; 
proximity to the cotton market was (Temin, 1976, p. 90). When describing 
Bank of United States, he gave a slightly different picture: contrary to 
Friedman and Schwartz’s strong assertions, this bank failed because of 
bad loans, especially in the real estate market (ibid., p. 92). Temin thus 
was the first economic historian to draw attention to the insolvency (that 
is, the fundamental weaknesses) of the banks that failed in the Great 
Depression, as opposed to their mere illiquidity.  
 A few years later, data were recovered on individual bank balance 
sheets, and with them part of the debate on the Great Depression shifted 
in focus. Many continued researching the actions of the Federal Reserve 
and analysing the different interest rate policies of the Reserve Banks 
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(Brunner, 1981; Romer and Romer, 1989; Wheelock, 1991; Wicker, 1996; 
Romer and Hsieh, 2001; Eichengreen, 2004; and Meltzer, 2001). Others 
turned to the labour market and looked for an explanation of persistent 
high wages, a major culprit for the slow recovery (Cole and Ohanian, 
1999; 2002; Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 2000; Ebell and Ritschl, 2008). But 
the new data on individual banks opened a new path for those trying to 
solve the insolvency (Temin) versus illiquidity (Friedman-Schwartz) 
debate. A number of economists started focusing exclusively on these 
balance sheets and on bank failures in order to better judge the possible 
inaccuracy of Friedman and Schwartz’s hypothesis. The hypothesis tested 
today by economic historians of this inclination is whether the banks that 
failed during crises were in fact in deep trouble beforehand, thus 
conferring to mass withdrawals and panics only the role of “last straws.” 
Several authors argue that these banks had been suffering from weak 
loans and investments well before they failed, and that there is little that 
the Federal Reserve could have done to alleviate the situation. However, 
most of these banking studies have occluded an important question, 
originally much emphasised by the first protagonists of the debate: the 
issue of the precipitating factors in the turning point from a normal 
recession to the Great Depression. If the banks that failed were indeed in 
deep trouble beforehand (often even before the start of the Depression as 
many authors point out), when did their troubles become unusually 
significant? And how did these troubles differ from the troubles they had 
experienced in the twenties? It will be seen that none of these new studies 
answer these specific questions, and that most confine themselves to 
determining whether banks suffered in general from insolvency or 
illiquidity problems. The question of the turning point has been pushed to 
the background, and for a good reason: first one needed to know whether 
or not insolvency problems indeed played a role in the collapse. Since this 
has arguably been established in many ways, now is a good time to go 
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back to the original question. Following is a brief summary of the literature 
focusing exclusively on bank insolvency. 
 There have been two main general studies looking at nationwide 
failures and determining their causes. The first one, by White (1984), 
focuses on national banks (as opposed to state-chartered banks) because 
at the time of writing it was the only data available. He regrets that this is 
the case since national banks accounted for only 12.4 percent of all 
suspensions, whereas state member and non-member banks made up 
2.4 percent and 85.2 per cent of all suspensions (White, 1984).5 He thus 
takes advantage of the available annual data from the Comptroller of the 
Currency’s Annual Reports and Individual Statements of Condition of 
National Banks to divide banks into two categories: banks that failed in the 
1930 crisis and those that did not.6 He then conducts logit regressions to 
determine whether certain financial ratios on these banks’ balance sheets 
one year prior to the crisis had a significant impact on their survival 
chances. Such financial ratios include, for example, total capital to assets, 
loans and discounts to assets and total deposits to assets. He concludes 
that, indeed, failures’ balance sheets on December 31, 1929 strongly 
determined their success or failure during the first banking crisis. He 
repeats this exercise, this time looking at their 1928 and 1927 balance 
sheets. Again, he finds that as far back as 1927 these variables 
determined the survival of banks in November to December 1930. His 
main conclusion is that “the strong similarity in the sign and significance of 
the coefficients from year to year suggests that the causes of bank 
                                                     
5 Member banks are members of the Federal Reserve System. A bank suspension 
occurs when a bank is temporarily or permanently closed, as opposed to a failure 
which occurs when a bank will permanently close and receivers take control of it to 
dissolve it. White excluded suspended banks that reopened as they represented only a 
small proportion (White, 1984). Note also that White affirms that the causes of failure of 
state and national banks were generally similar, as they competed strongly with one 
another in almost all parts of the country (ibid.).  
6 For the survivors White uses a stratified random sample of banks with similar assets 
from the same geographical locations.  
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failures did not change substantially as the nation entered the 
depression.” White thus delivers crucial conclusions as to the possibility of 
bank insolvency, and presents important information regarding the 
continuity of banks’ conditions from the onset of the slump up to and 
including the first banking crisis. However, he does not address the 
question that logically comes to mind when confronted to such evidence: if 
these ratios, even taken as early as 1927, were indeed important factors 
for bank failures, is there a point at which they were significantly 
weakened before the crisis itself? 
 The second countrywide study does not do a better job at 
answering this question. Calomiris and Mason (2003) study a national 
panel of the 8,707 member banks (out of 24,504 banks in total) from 1929 
to 1933, using data on individual banks from the Office of the 
Comptroller’s Reports of Condition at two points in time, namely 
December 1929 and December 1931 (Calomiris and Mason, 2003).7 They 
apply a survival duration model which allows various variables (including 
aggregate and regional economic indicators) to determine chances and 
length of survival for each bank at various points in time. They conclude 
that the financial ratios indeed determine length of survival, at least for the 
first two Friedman-Schwartz crises. The only real exception is the fourth 
banking crisis (early 1933) which “saw a large unexplained increase in 
bank failure risk” (ibid., 2003). Although this analysis goes furthest in the 
analysis of survival duration and dynamics, it still fails to identify a point of 
deterioration in bank balance sheets. In the regressions in particular, there 
is not even a distinction between the possibly different impacts of 1929 
and 1931 financial ratios. Moreover, like White, they do not analyse the 
behaviour of ratios over the preceding decade.  
More recently, Richardson (2007) looks at a newly discovered 
qualitative dataset from the US National Archives containing 
                                                     
7 Member banks are members of the Federal Reserve System.  
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questionnaires on each member bank suspension hand-completed by 
Federal Reserve controllers. As interesting and indicative as these 
questionnaires may be, they but cannot provide as precise information as 
the balance sheet themselves. The questionnaires contain information on, 
for example, whether the primary cause of failure was large withdrawals 
or weak loans. But there is no way to check what process of inquiry led 
the controller to tick one box instead of another.8 Richardson nevertheless 
concludes that during banking crises the main reason for failure was mass 
withdrawals, but that weak loans were the primary cause in nonpanic 
windows. Unfortunately, this kind of information still cannot answer the 
question of the kind and timing of the precipitation factors. 
 Four published studies have related Chicago city bank failures to 
balance sheet variables (probably due to the quality of the data available 
and the magnitude of Chicago troubles). The first of these was published 
at the end of the Depression by Thomas (1935), and it seems that the 
data used there were only recovered some fifty years later.9 Relying on 
the Statements of State Banks of Illinois, Thomas compared the June 29, 
1929 balance sheets of Great Depression surviving banks with 1931 
failures. He found that for outlying Chicago banks (that is, those located 
outside the Chicago Loop), failures made more loans on real estate, had 
more assets invested in bank building and other real estate, and had 
accumulated relatively smaller surpluses. Fifty years later, Esbitt looked at 
the 1927, 1928 and 1929 balance sheets of 1930, 1931 and 1932 
Chicago failures, using the same data source. He found that differences in 
mean variables between failures and survivors are only significant for 
1931 failures. Banks failing in 1931 held fewer secondary reserves, had 
more invested in fixed assets, and had lower levels of earned capital than 
non-failing banks. He found that this was not the case for banks failing in 
                                                     
8 I have checked these questionnaires in the U.S. National Archives myself. 
9 Indeed, Temin himself did not seem to be aware of their existence.  
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1930 and 1932, and failed to comment on the comparison between 1927, 
1928 and 1929 balance sheets (Esbitt, 1986).  
The most famous Chicago study is by Calomiris and Mason (1997), 
who compare the December 1931 balance sheets of banks that failed in 
the June 1932 panic with those that failed in 1932 before the panic and 
those that remained solvent from January to July. They use data on both 
state and national banks from the Statements as well as from the newly-
discovered Reports of Condition from the Office of Comptroller of 
Currency. Their aim is to determine (with survival duration analysis) 
whether simple depositor hysteria in a panic moment really caused banks 
to fail. They find that this was not the case, and that indeed panic failures 
had more in common with other banks failing during 1932 than with 
survivors: they had lower market values to book values, lower ratios of 
reserves to demand deposits, lower ratios of retained earnings to net 
worth, and higher proportions of long-term debt. Finally, even more 
recently Guglielmo (forthcoming) looks at state banks in Chicago as well 
as the whole state of Illinois.  He compares the June 29, 1929 balance 
sheets of all these banks (Great Depression failures and survivors) using 
similar methods as Esbitt (1986) and Calomiris and Mason (1997), and 
draws similar conclusions for Illinois banks inside and outside Chicago.  
Again, none of these authors have attempted to map the evolution 
of these financial ratios before, during and after the first banking crisis. In 
the face of such evidence on the importance of balance sheet 
weaknesses (indeed, none of this evidence has been refuted as yet), it is 
difficult not to inquire into this issue. White (1984) and Esbitt (1986) seem 
to have come closest to this goal, by simply reporting differences in those 
variables for various reporting dates from June 1927 to December 1929. 
However, they fail to rigorously compare the evolution of these ratios, and 
do not include data on the whole 1923-33 period. Such is the aim of this 
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research, and the data as well as the results obtained are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
2.  Trends in Bank Balance Sheets  
Introduction  
The analytical core of this research will be a mapping of the 
evolution of 193 state bank balance sheets (by cohort) from December 
1923 to June 1933 of both Great Depression survivors and failures. The 
last date for the core of this study will be June 1933 for two reasons. First, 
even if the focus is on the period preceding the first banking crisis, all data 
on banks until this date need to be collected to determine which survived 
and which failed. Second, when looking for a turning point it will be 
important to keep the post-crisis evolution in the background. This central 
part of the dissertation is divided into four main sections: 1) sources, 2) 
data organization (which deals with a) cohorts, b) consolidations and c) 
bank size and outliers), 3) analysis of (a) the 1920s, and (b) the 1929-
1933 period. Some qualitative aspects of roaring Chicago in the post 
World War I era will be the subject of the last part of the dissertation (Part 
III, which also deals with the issue of bank regulation). 
A turning point, in the sense of the first point on a new long-term 
trend, is hypothesised to have existed not only before Chicago was badly 
hit by a major banking crisis in June 1931, but even before the first 
banking crisis as identified by Friedman-Schwartz (the November-
December 1930 crisis, by which Chicago was slightly less affected than 
other places in the US). In other words, I expect to see certain financial 
ratios starting a new downturn or upswing between June 1928 and June 
1930. As the data are semi-annual, there is no data available between the 
end of June 1930 and the end of December 1930. Nevertheless, it will be 
seen that a turning point is already identifiable for a number of financial 
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ratios in June 1930 or before. There may be different turning points for 
different financial ratios. 
Some of the financial ratios analysed in the 1920s section (for 
example, loans on real estate) differ from those analysed in the 1929-33 
section (for example, bills payable and rediscounts to total assets). The 
reason is that often the relevant financial ratios during a crisis, when 
banks are less in control of the situation, are not necessarily the relevant 
ones in times of prosperity. For example, the evolution of the real estate 
loan share is of particular interest in good times (as it may show for 
instance a rise in risk-taking) but its evolution in bad times cannot really 
give any clues as to the actual worsening of the situation. A better variable 
for this question would be retained earnings to net worth, which indicates 
the recent profitability of a bank. Indeed, this ratio may have been quite 
high prior to the depression, and start decreasing during the depression.  
The initial analysis of the 1920s (section 3a) will both support the 
significance of the turning points (that is, the degree of bank vulnerability 
they indicate) and help explain why they occurred. It will make a point of 
linking the 1920s analysis to the depression itself (section 3b). The 
coincidence of time of failure on the one hand (as represented by the 
different cohorts), and 1920s as well as depression variables behaviour 
on the other will act as a strong link between the two parts. Note that the 
issue of the representativeness of Chicago for the rest of the U.S. goes 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, although it will be discussed briefly 
at in Part III.  
 
2.1 Sources  
 There are two main sources of data that are detailed enough for this 
kind of study. The most complete one is semi-annual and focuses solely 
on state-chartered banks (both member and non-member of the Federal 
Reserve System): it is the Statements of State Banks of Illinois, published 
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by the Illinois Auditor of Public Accounts. As mentioned earlier, there were 
other such Statements for other states, but those for Illinois are unusually 
detailed. Banks generally reported in June and December of each year, 
which allows me to look at balance sheets in all years from 1923 up 1933. 
I collected these data at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C, on 
volumes starting from 1923 up to June 1933. There were five volumes 
missing for the 1920-23 period, and since they concern mainly the 1920-
21 recession,10 this period is not examined here. At any rate, many of the 
banks that went through the Great Depression did not yet exist at that 
time, so the main analysis will focus on the 1923-1933 period.11 Most of 
the other volumes for the years 1923-33 have been used, making sure 
that there was at least one data point for each year, and that all the semi-
annual data points were reported starting in June 1928. Thus, the full 
dataset includes the following data points: December 1923, December 
1924, June 1925, June 1926, June 1927, June and December 1928, June 
and December 1930, June and December 1931, June and December 
1932 and June 1933. All Statement reports give asset book values. 
Another major source of data used for this study was the Rand 
McNally Bankers’ Directory, published in January and July of every year. 
The data were collected at the Federal Reserve Board Research Library 
in Washington, D.C. This is a recognised source for tracking down bank 
name changes and consolidations, as well as the type of consolidation 
(whether merger or acquisition) and date of the event. The Statements 
already provided elements of information in this respect, but the Rand 
McNally is much more detailed. The next section will explain how I dealt 
with these changes. 
                                                     
10 The NBER website defines this recession as lasting from the spring of 1920 to the 
summer of 1921. However, James (1938, p.939) and Hoyt (1933, p. 236) see the real 
recovery as starting only in early 1922. 
11 For example, of the 46 failures of June 1931 only 18 existed in May 1920, whereas 
41 of them already existed by December 1923. 
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Finally, I should mention that there is another source of data which 
may have been used had it been available. The Reports of Condition from 
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency discovered for the first time by 
Calomiris and Mason about ten years ago focus on all member banks 
(both state and national) nationwide at disaggregated levels, and contain 
very detailed information on individual banks, including qualitative 
information. Unfortunately, the Reports are only available in microfilm from 
the Records Office at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, 
which members of the public can only retrieve filing a Freedom of 
Information Act request and paying a large amount.12 At any rate, for my 
study these Reports may have proved insufficient: the extant reports for 
state member banks are available for the same dates as the Statements 
and are less complete since they include only state member banks, and 
for national member banks the only available reports are for December 
1929 and December 1931 (which partly explains why Calomiris and 
Mason focused exclusively on these two reporting dates).13 There are no 
reports for 1930, which is a crucial year for this research. For the time 
being, my research will remain focused on the Statements. This should 
not be a problem because, as pointed out above, state banks accounted 
for 87.6 percent of all suspensions, whereas member banks accounted for 
only 12.4 percent of suspensions (White, 1984).  
 
2.2. Data Organization 
a) Cohorts 
For the analysis of the Great Depression banks have been divided 
into five groups: survivors, June 31 failures, June 32 failures, June 33 
                                                     
12 I filed the FOIA request which was approved. However for 18 Chicago state member 
bank call reports and 6 Chicago national member bank reports the cost of the microfilm 
rolls would have been $600. For a CD of these call reports the cost would have been 
$4,200 (email conversation with the Records Office).   
13 Details of the available volumes are described by Mason (1998).  
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failures, and all depression failures.14 The survivor category includes only 
the banks present at every point in time from June 1929 to June 1933 
inclusive. It is important that this category include the “existing in June 
1929” condition as some banks (only a few) were created during the 
depression and failed soon after their creation. This system allows me to 
keep the same sample size at least over the whole depression period (see 
below on sample sizes). The same applies to the other cohorts, except for 
all depression failures. Indeed, although I have included the all depression 
failures in some of the graphs as an indication of a sort of “average” of all 
the failing cohorts, many would point out that this is not a consistent 
category. Since this cohort includes banks that failed along the way at 
different points in time, the sample size changes between each data 
points and the data tend to be biased upwards as we get closer to June 
1933. Therefore, it seemed rational to include cohorts from every year that 
are exclusive in the sense that each cohort excludes the banks that failed 
before the “window of failure” for the whole cohort. For example, the June 
1931 cohort does not include banks that had failed by December 1930. It 
only includes banks that had survived until December 1930 and failed 
between the start of 1931 and June of that year. And so on for the other 
cohorts. The choice of the windows of failure was necessarily somewhat 
arbitrary but not entirely so. Chicago suffered from banking crises in 
December 1930, but especially in the spring of 1931 and in the spring and 
early June of 1932. Thus selecting the banks that failed between 
December 1930 and June 1931 and banks that failed between December 
1931 and June 1932 allows me to include banks that were especially 
affected by banking crises, so as not to bias the samples in a way that 
would include more “nonpanic” failures.15 
                                                     
14 Note that the June 1933 cohort will often be termed “June 1933 exclusive cohort” in 
order not to be confused with the all depression failure cohort.  
15 The literature often differentiates between so-called “panic” and “nonpanic” failures.  
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Table 1 shows the different cohorts and their status at each of the 
reporting dates. It should be noted that for each cohort (except for the 
survivors) there is never a data point for the date by which banks failed. 
This is logical: as the banks no longer exist there is no data for these 
banks. Thus, for instance, the June 1931 failure curve will stop in 
December 1930, the June 1932 failure curve stops in December 1931, 
and so on. The table confirms that exactly the same sample size and 
content was kept during the years of the Great Depression for all cohorts 
except the all depression failures.  
 
Table 1: The Great Depression Cohorts 
 
Bank 
Existed ? 
June 
1929 
Dec 
1929 
June 
1930 
Dec 
1930 
June 
1931 
Dec 
1931 
June 
1932 
Dec 
1932 
June 
1933 
Survivors 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
June 1931 
exclusive 
Failures 
YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
June 1932 
exclusive 
Failures 
YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
June 1933 
exclusive 
Failures 
YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
ALL GD 
Failures 
YES YES 
OR NO 
YES 
OR NO
YES 
OR NO
YES 
OR NO
YES 
OR NO
YES 
OR 
NO 
YES 
OR 
NO 
NO 
 
Source: Statements of State Banks of Illinois. 
 
For the 1923-1928 analysis (section 3a) each data point is based 
on those banks from the corresponding cohort that existed at the 
corresponding date. Often some of the banks that were part of a GD 
cohort were not present in every year from 1923 to 1928. For example, 
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there were 46 “1931” failures, but only 39 of them were present in June 
1926. This number sometimes fluctuates between December 1923 and 
December 1928 due to the appearance and disappearance of one or 
more banks (in this example the fall to 39 banks was only temporary).16 I 
could have chosen to reduce the whole June 1931 cohort sample to 39 
banks (since this is the lowest number of banks for this cohort in the 
1920s) but I give priority to full population study in the years of the 
depression itself.17 Most of the time the loss in sample size is only 
between one and three banks, and the loss is not systematic in the sense 
that the sample size does not change according to a particular upward or 
downward trend, unlike in the depression. There are only two data points 
which seem “worrisome”: June 1926 for June 1931 and June 1933 
failures, where the sample size temporarily falls by 5 and 4 banks 
respectively. This might bias these two data points upwards but there is 
no significant worry for the rest of the 1920s period. Moreover, the 
changes in sample size are counterbalanced by the extra accuracy gained 
by maximising the sample size at each data point during this period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 In some rare instances a bank could temporarily close and re-open. This happened 
for a few banks especially around June 1926.  
17 For each variable the corresponding time series graph in section a) and b) spans the 
whole 1923-1933 period. Another option was to have a unique sample size for the 
1920s which differed from the GD sample size. This is arguably less rigorous than 
including all the banks from the GD sample that were present at each data point.  
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Table 2. Great Depression Survivors and Failures, 1923-1933 
 
 Number of Survivors 
Number 
of June 
1931 
Failures 
Number 
of June 
1932 
Failures
Number of 
June 1933 
Failures 
(exclusive)
Number 
of ALL 
GD 
Failures
Failure 
Rate (as % 
of the 193 
banks 
existing in 
June 1929) 
Compound 
Failure 
Rate 
Dec 
1923 32 41 35 12 143   
Dec 
1924 32 44 34 13 146   
June 
1925 31 44 34 13 147   
June 
1926 30 39 34 9 140   
June 
1927 32 44 35 14 148   
June 
1928 31 44 36 11 153   
Dec 
1928 32 41 35 14 147   
June 
1929 33 46 36 14 160 0% 0% 
Dec 
1929 33 46 36 14 147 7% 7% 
June 
1930 33 46 36 14 136 6% 12% 
Dec 
1930 33 46 36 14 123 7% 19% 
June 
1931 33 0 36 14 77 24% 43% 
Dec 
1931 33 0 36 14 57 10% 53% 
June 
1932 33 0 0 14 22 18% 72% 
Dec 
1932 33 0 0 14 17 3% 74% 
June 
1933 33 0 0 0 0 9% 83% 
 
Source: Statements of State Banks of Illinois. 
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Table 2 shows the sample sizes for each cohort at various points in 
time.  
As is easily seen from this table, out of 193 banks which existed in 
June 1929, 160 banks failed and 33 banks survived. 46 banks failed 
between December 1930 and June 1931, 36 banks failed between 
December 1931 and June 1932 and 14 banks failed between December 
1932 and June 1933. Although 19% of all banks had already failed by 
December 1930, the failure rate accelerated in the spring of 1931 where 
24% of all banks failed in this six months period. This was the highest rate 
of failure, which then declined but was still substantial for example 
between December 1931 and June 1932 (18%).  
Naturally, not only does the number of banks that failed matter, but 
also the amount of deposits at these banks. Figure 1 shows the fall in total 
deposits (demand plus time deposits) for survivors, all GD failures and 
June 1932 failures from June 1929 to June 1933. As mentioned earlier the 
all GD failure curve is to be handled with care. Nevertheless it allows us to 
have data points up to and including December 1932. This would also be 
the case if we included the June 1933 exclusive banks cohort but these 
14 banks are certainly not the most representative of the failing banks 
sample.18 As the graph makes clear, the evolution of the rate of deposit 
loss for both survivors and failures corresponds quite closely to that of the 
failure rate (especially survivors and June 32 failures). Even banks that 
survived suffered large deposit losses during the periods where the failure 
rates were higher. The difference in levels between survivors and failures 
will not be subject to comment here.19 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 The point here is not to compare the different failing cohorts.  
19 See section 1c for a discussion about bank size. 
 
 
 
22
Figure 1: Total Deposits (Demand Plus Time Deposits) for Three Cohorts: 
GD Survivors, June 1932 Failures and all Depression Failures. 
 
 
 
Source: Statements of State Banks of Illinois. 
 
b) Name Changes and Consolidations 
 Creating cohorts is an essential way of keeping track of the same 
sample of banks, whether failures or survivors (aside from its advantages 
for economic analysis). Another essential feature of this aim is linked to 
name changes and consolidations. As previously mentioned, I had all the 
data needed for this purpose. Name changes were corrected in 26 
instances. However, I still had to make decisions about whether to include 
a merger or acquisition in the failing or surviving categories.  
Note first that some banks were closed at some point and then 
reopened. As Table 2 demonstrates, such banks were automatically 
excluded from the depression samples (there were very few of them) as 
was also done by White (1984).  
A consolidation was “the corporate union of two or more banks into 
one bank which continued operations as a single business entity and 
under a single charter” (Richardson, 2007). During the depression, 
mergers were distinguished as “shotgun weddings,” as opposed to 
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takeovers which were part of the “purge and merge system” (James, 
1938, p. 994). Both of these operations (merger and takeover) are usually 
considered in the literature as a major sign of weakness. Consequently, 
most authors include such consolidations as failures; that is, a bank that 
was taken over is usually considered a failure, and so are both of the 
banks that merged, even when the merger itself ended up surviving the 
Depression. For instance, Calomiris and Mason (2003) specify that their 
data “contain almost seventy different ways a bank can exit the dataset, 
ranging from all imaginable types of mergers and acquisitions to relatively 
simple voluntary liquidations and receiverships; [...] together, we term 
[them] failures.” The Reports of Conditions they used were more detailed 
in this respect, and I do not have data on “all types of mergers and 
acquisitions.” Nevertheless, the Rand McNally directory gives sufficient 
detail at least on whether a merger or a simple takeover occurred.  
As in Calomiris and Mason (2003) I thought reasonable to count as 
failures banks that were taken over by other banks. This occurred in 14 
cases from June 1929 onwards. The banks that were taken over before 
June 1929 are not taken into account in the sense that only the resulting 
consolidation should be part of a GD cohort. Exactly the same applies to 
pre-June 1929 mergers: only the resulting merger can be part of a GD 
cohort and thus only this bank will be tracked as early as possible in the 
1920s. Table 3 shows the mergers that occurred from June 1929 onwards 
and whether the merger ended up failing or not. For the mergers that had 
failed by June 1933, the two original banks’ data are kept until they merge 
under a new name, at which point the new merger’s data are excluded 
from the dataset, making the two original banks failures at the time of 
consolidation. This can be justified on two grounds. One technical: it is 
impossible to include the new bank’s data as it cannot be part of any 
cohort starting in June 1929. The other theoretical: it can be argued that 
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two banks ending up failing as a merger were particularly weak at the time 
of merger.  
Whether or not one should include a merger that ended up 
surviving is another matter. Contrary to what Calomiris and Mason claim, 
that such a merger should be categorised as a failure is not self-evident. 
Fortunately, in my dataset there was only one such merger in Chicago: 
the Central Republic Bank and Trust Co, a July 1931 consolidation of 
Central Trust Co of Illinois and of Chicago Trust Co. Eventually I chose to 
consider the two original banks as failures for the technical reason put 
forward above. Nevertheless, one should be aware that that there is an 
element of arbitrariness in this decision.  
 
Table 3. Mergers between June 1929 and June 1933 
 
Bank 1 Bank 2 New Merger 
First 
Reporting 
Date 
Failing? Decision Made 
The Foreman 
Trust and 
Savings Bank 
State Bank 
Foreman-State 
Trust and 
Savings Bank 
Dec 1929 Yes, Jan 1931 
Banks 1 
and 2 
FAILED 
Roosevelt 
State Bank 
Bankers 
State Bank 
Roosevelt-
Bankers State 
Bank 
June 1930 Yes, Aug 1930 
Banks 1 
and 2 
FAILED 
Builders and 
Merchants 
State Bank 
Capital 
State 
Savings 
Bank 
Builders and 
Merchants Bank 
and Trust Co 
Nov 1930 
Yes, 
April 
1931 
Banks 1 
and 2 
FAILED 
Central Trust 
Co of Illinois 
Chicago 
Trust Co 
Central Republic 
Bank and Trust 
Co 
July 31 No 
Banks 1 
and 2 
FAILED 
 
Source: Statements of State Banks of Illinois, and Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory. 
 
 
c) Bank Size and Outliers 
This section deals with the problem of bank size and of outliers 
more generally.  
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First of all, it should be noted that bank size is not necessarily a 
problem in the sense that it does not necessarily introduce bias in the 
results. Most of the time it does not because authors make a point of 
studying mainly financial ratios (for example, US government investments 
to total bonds and stocks). So even if a bank has, say, a larger proportion 
of US government bonds it does not indicate that this bank is larger (and 
has more US government bonds in terms of their absolute amount). When 
looking at the main indicators of bank size (total assets, total capital, and 
sometimes total deposits), it appears that larger banks did tend to have a 
higher survivor rate. However, one of the aims of this dissertation is 
precisely to show that this was certainly not the only reason for their 
survival (of course, it may be that there is a correlation between larger 
bank size and better management practices). Figure 1 above shows the 
difference in total deposits for survivors and failures. It appears that 
although survivors suffered very large deposit losses during the 
depression, in June 1929 the amount of deposits they had was almost 
twice as high as for June 32 failures. Figures 2 and 3 show a similar 
picture for the two main measures of bank size: total assets and total 
capital.  
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Figure 2: Total Assets for GD Survivors, June 1932 Exclusive Failures 
and all Depression Failures. 
 
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
Figure 3: Total Capital (Capital, Surplus and Retained Earnings) for GD 
Survivors, June 1932 Exclusive Failures and all Depression Failures. 
 
 
 
Source: Statements. 
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In both of these graphs the difference between survivors and 
failures is almost constant over time, except towards the end of the 
depression (where all depression failures that remain in the dataset 
become more similar to survivors). For both categories, assets and capital 
rose until the start of the depression, when assets started to fall and 
capital more or less continued its rise upwards, probably due to cautionary 
practices. Capital started to fall more for survivors from about December 
1931, but not by as much as their assets fell. This may be due to less 
cautionary practices among survivors as they may not have feared for 
their assets as much as future failures did (this will be discussed in more 
detail below). As a side note, I should point out that when performing even 
a simple static analysis of survivors and failures, say in June 1929, 
pointing to total capital as an absolute amount is misleading if one wants 
to eliminate the size effect.20 What should matter is the capital to total 
assets ratio, and it will be seen that contrary to what one would expect this 
was not a relevant variable in explaining failures (see section 3a).  
The statistics on size effects for failure rates are quite telling, 
although one should not draw too strong conclusions about them. Table 4 
shows the failure rate per size group.  
 
Table 4. Relationship between Bank Size and Failure Rate between June 
1929 and June 1933 
 
Total Capital Number of Banks 
Number of 
Failures Failure Rate
Less than $250,000 87 77 89% 
$250,001-$375,000 16 14 88% 
$375,001-$800,000 45 36 80% 
More than $800,000 45 33 73% 
 
Source: Statements. 
                                                     
20 This was nevertheless done by Guglielmo (forthcoming). 
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From this table it appears that, contrary to Guglielmo’s conclusions, there 
is indeed a relationship between size and failure, although this 
relationship is not very strong. True, whether big or small, banks had a 
large failure rate, always above 70%. Nevertheless, it is still noticeable 
that banks with less than $250,000 in capital had 89% chances of failing, 
whereas banks whose capital went beyond $800,000 “only” had a failure 
rate of 73%. There is in fact a large literature on whether bank size 
matters for failure rates. The last part of this dissertation (Part III) briefly 
deals with the issue of branch banking in the US, which was prohibited at 
the time in the whole state of Illinois. Many authors (including Calomiris 
and Mason, 2003) have shown that prohibition of branch-banking was an 
important cause of failure. Moreover, state banks were often smaller than 
national banks, which may explain their higher failure rate. It will be seen 
through anecdotal evidence that one reason why they may have been 
more vulnerable was not necessarily so much a lack of asset 
diversification due to geographic constraints as it was a lack of training 
and knowledge in management.  
 Although bank size in general does not introduce any bias in 
financial ratios, outliers do. Table 5 shows summary statistics per cohort 
in terms of total capital in June 1929.                                     
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Table 5. Summary Statistics, June 1929 
 
Total Capital ($) GD Survivors 
June 1933 
excl. Failures 
June 1932 
Failures June 1931 Failures
Sample Size 193 46 36 14 
Mean 1,415,548 2,330,029 567,413 535,472 
Median 791,418 684,122 435,440 334,079 
Mean excluding 
Bottom & Top 
5%  
904,077 949,235 514,964 472,862 
Upper Quartile 1,330,430 1,268,829 687,265 590,522 
Lower Quartile 263,362 351,652 320,372 259,449 
Upper 5% 
percentile 5,823,128 9,465,185 1,455,455 1,466,596 
Lower 5% 
percentile 156,293 225,346 214,590 130,995 
Standard 
Deviation 2,407,887 5,436,764 409,476 450,487 
Coeff. Variation 1.70 2.33 0.72 0.84 
Maximum 11,626,256 21,004,598 2,076,895 2,250,902 
Minimum 124,742 225,000 181,904 121,326 
Skewness 3.41 3.60 2.08 1.93 
Kurtosis 11.96 13.21 4.86 3.97 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
The way outliers bias the sample is quite clear from this table. First, 
in all four cases median total capital is lower than the mean, often 
substantially so. For example, for survivors, the mean total capital is 
$1,415,548 which is almost twice the median ($791,418). For June 1933 
exclusive failures the comparison shows an even larger gap: the mean is 
almost three and a half times as big as the median. This pattern is similar 
for the other two cohorts but to a lesser extent. Even more impressively, 
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the upper quartile in the first two cohorts lies below the mean. This is 
evidence that a small number of very large values in comparison to the 
rest of the sample have brought the mean upwards to the extent that a 
simple mean is not representative of the totality of the banks. For June 
1933 failures, for example, the mean is $2,330,029 whereas the upper 
quartile is only $1,268,829. For the other two cohorts the upper quartile is 
only slightly above the mean. The two cohorts that show the largest 
variation around their means are again the survivors and June 1933 
cohorts, whose coefficients of variation are respectively 1.7 and 2.3. 
Although survivors’ median is $791,418 and their mean $1,415,548, data 
points range from $124,742 to $11,626,256. A similar pattern is 
observable for the other three cohorts, although again the last show less 
variation. Finally, all three cohorts are skewed to the right, and all have a 
rather peaked distribution, especially the first two. 
Thus, as the means do not seem to represent even the upper 
quartile of the distribution in many cases, it seems reasonable to look for a 
solution to exclude outliers. Of course, excluding outliers in banking is 
always problematic as half the outliers are particularly large banks, which 
often matter a lot in terms of their economic impact on depositors. When 
excluding outliers it is thus crucial to make sure to exclude only a few 
banks. However, there is always an element of arbitrariness in this 
process, and it would be wrong to hand pick a few banks rather than 
applying a systematic rule. One possibility is to use median values instead 
of means. A problem with this solution, however, is that it fails to take into 
account the skewness of the data to the right. At first it appeared 
reasonable to exclude the top and bottom 5 percent of the banks in terms 
of their total capital, which brought values closer to the median. However, 
it soon appeared that the outliers in total capital at one point in time were 
not necessarily the outliers in other financial items. This is illustrated by 
Figures 4 and 5, where it is apparent that the June 1929 outliers in total 
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capital are not the same as the June 1929 outliers in “other real estate.”21 
Only one bank is an outlier in both categories: the largest bank, 
Continental Bank of Illinois. 
 
Figure 4: Scatter Plot for Total Capital in June 1929, all Banks. 
 
 
The top ten values plotted are (in descending order): Continental Bank of Illinois, 
Central Trust Co of Illinois, First Union Trust and Savings, State Bank of Chicago, 
Harris Trust and Savings, The Northern Trust and Co, Chicago Trust Co, The Foreman 
Trust and Savings, The Peoples Trust and Savings, Madison-Kedzie Trust and 
Savings. 
Source: Statements. 
 
Figure 5: Scatter Plot for Other Real Estate in June 1929, all Banks. 
 
The top ten values plotted are (in descending order): West Town State Bank, Chicago 
City Bank and Trust Co, Continental Bank of Illinois, Northwestern Trust and Savings, 
Home Bank and Trust Co, The West Side Trust and Savings, The Pullman Trust and 
Savings, Union Bank of Chicago, Humboldt State Bank, Fidelity Trust and Savings. 
Source: Statements. 
                                                     
21 As will be demonstrated later this is a crucial variable (see section 3).  
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 Therefore, I decided to exclude from the mean the bottom and top 5 
percent, doing so for each category and for each cohort. This is a 
systematic way of excluding outlying values (which are not necessarily 
always the same banks) in every category. This way I also avoided 
excluding systematically the same banks, which can be argued to be a 
more rigorous way of dealing with outliers. As can be seen from Table 5 
above, the “Mean excluding Bottom & Top 5%” row gives values which 
are always higher than the medians but lower than the means, and which 
are usually closer to the medians. This technique thus seems a good 
compromise between using means and using medians.  
 
2.3. Trends in Bank Balance Sheets: 1923-1933 
 We are now ready to start the analysis of the time series. The 
following section focuses primarily on the pre-Great Depression era (from 
1923 to around 1929), but does not exclude some early comments on the 
Great Depression itself. Most of the analysis of the depression will be 
conducted in the following section (section 3b). Part of the reason for this 
separation, as explained in the introduction to Part II, is that the relevant 
financial ratios at the beginning of a depression may differ from the 
relevant ones for the pre-depression era. At least this is what the data 
suggest in two ways. First, as will be shown below, long-run behaviour in 
the 1920s affected greatly the time of failure of the banks during the 
depression: early failures had behaved in a more risky way since as early 
as 1923, mid-depression failures had acted slightly less riskily, and late-
depression failures had acted more like survivors for almost a decade. 
Second, the variables that start an upswing or a downturn after June 1929 
which are relevant to the time of failure are often not the same as those 
marking banks’ 1920s behaviour. However, often a link between the two is 
apparent; the link being thrown into light by the coincidence of the time of 
failure. A good example is real estate and “other” real estate (the amount 
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of repossessed property after foreclosures): for early failures the share of 
real estate was high in the 1920s, whereas its share of other real estate 
was low, while during the depression the former remained quite stable 
whereas the latter ratcheted up. With such evidence that the earlier a 
bank failed, the more it had invested in real estate in the 1920s and the 
more it was affected by foreclosures at the start of the depression, one 
can only conclude that, at least in this case, pre-depression behaviour 
affected in-depression health through a related variable. This also goes 
against what White (2009) recently argued: that mid-1920s bank 
behaviour (especially in real estate) had little or no effect on bank health 
in the crisis.  
Thus, this section will focus primarily on such variables as capital to 
assets, fixed assets, US government investments, real estate, time 
deposits, other bonds and stocks, and the reserve-deposit ratio. The 
depression section will be primarily concerned with retained earnings to 
net worth, bills payable and rediscounts, and especially “other real estate.” 
Both sections will demonstrate that, on the one hand, the time of failure 
was greatly correlated with long-run portfolio management in the 1920s 
(especially with risky investment in less liquid assets), and, on the other 
hand, that the health of failures started to seriously deteriorate before the 
first banking crisis. So far, the literature had only demonstrated that failing 
banks had been weaker than survivors at a certain point before their time 
of failure. Sections 3 and 4 show for how long they had been weaker, 
when they became significantly more vulnerable, and which cohorts were 
weaker than others.  
 
a) 1923-1928  
 In a recent paper, White (2009) criticizes various authors for 
“confounding the problems of the real estate bust with the Great 
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Depression.” One of these authors is Simpson (1933), a contemporary of 
the Great Depression who quite emphatically asserted that: 
 
“(...) We can say this much: that real estate, real estate 
securities, real estate affiliations in some form, have been 
the single largest factor in the failure of the 4,800 [US] banks 
that have closed their doors during the past three years” 
(Simpson, 1933, p. 4). 
 
Although the burst of the 1926 real estate bubble may not have 
been the “single largest” cause of the Great Depression, it seems odd to 
dismiss this factor entirely as White does. As will be demonstrated, this is 
especially true for the city of Chicago. Despite mainly focusing on static 
analysis, authors who have analysed bank balance sheets almost always 
conclude that the share of real estate loans is at least one determinant of 
failure. Talking about the United States as a whole, Temin (1976) already 
pointed to a fall in construction from 1927 as a crucial factor. He 
emphasised this point when discussing the case of the failure of Bank of 
United States in New York, and his idea was later corroborated by Lucia 
(1984).  
 Unfortunately, most authors have focused mainly on a comparative 
description of survivors and depression failures at one or two points in 
time, a type of analysis which can be improved to strengthen, for example, 
the argument about the relative importance of the real estate loan share 
or about the weakness of failures in general. Figure 6 shows the typical 
comparison of financial ratios in the literature. Note that some authors 
often add a logit regression to test for the actual survival or failure of a 
bank; others (especially Calomiris and Mason [2003]) add a survival 
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duration model to test the length of survival of a bank given its balance 
sheet at one or two data points.22  
 
Figure 6: Static Comparison of all Depression Failures and Survivors in 
June 1929 in Chicago 
 
 
Showing US government bonds to total assets, real estate loans to total assets, other 
real estate to total assets, and banking house to total assets.  
Source: Statements. 
 
 Although the exact meaning of each ratio will be discussed in more 
detail later, this June 1929 snapshot indeed shows the pre-depression 
weakness of depression failures in Chicago: they had fewer US 
Treasuries invested as a share of total assets, more real estate loans 
(which are considered less liquid than other types of loans), more other 
real estate, and they invested more in banking premises. Other variables 
often include the reserve-deposit ratio, other bonds and stocks to total 
assets, due to banks to total assets and bills payable and rediscounts to 
total assets. Again the same questions come to mind: how long had they 
                                                     
22 Recall that Calomiris and Masons’s (2003) study goes furthest in the analysis of 
survival duration and dynamics. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier they fail to analyse 
the evolution of financial ratios over time, whether in the 1920s or even during the 
depression, and only look at aggregate results of survival duration. 
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been carrying these assets? When did the gap between survivors and 
failures appear? What change in variables rendered failures particularly 
vulnerable once depression had started? Figures 7 to 11 give answers to 
the first two questions.  
 Figure 7 looks at the real estate loan share since 1923 for all five 
cohorts: survivors, all depression failures, June 1931 failures, June 1932 
failures and June 1933 exclusive failures.23 Here it is only given as a link 
to the previous bar chart. Note, as mentioned before, that the time series 
for the 1920s should be handled with care, as sometimes the sample size 
drops by one or two banks, up to a maximum of seven banks. This is 
necessary if one wants to keep the full sample size for the depression era 
(see section b). 
 
Figure 7: Real Estate Loan Share, December 1923 to June 1933. 
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
                                                     
23 Later on the “all depression failures” category will be dropped since (as was argued 
earlier) it is not a very rigorous sample. 
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 Although I am mainly focusing on the pre-depression era here, the 
rise in the share of real estate loans after June 1929 should not be taken 
for granted as most banks suffered a large fall in assets. The pre-
depression pattern is of great interest, however. First, it appears in 
general that survivors often had the lowest share during most of the 
1920s, followed closely by June 1933 failures. June 1932 failures had a 
substantially higher share, and the June 1931 failures’ share was even 
higher. This is outstanding evidence that the earlier the banks failed, the 
more they had invested in real estate in the previous decade, as early as 
1923. Second, all cohorts  reach a peak in real estate loan investment 
between 1925 and 1927, which corresponds to the peak in the real estate 
boom (see Part III for more information on real estate). June 1932 failures 
reach the peak later than June 1931 failures, but neither really depart from 
this peak afterwards, whereas survivors do. In particular, for survivors, the 
low December 1928 value cannot correspond to a rise in assets at this 
point since, as can be seen from Figure 2, total assets are relatively low at 
this point. In other words, survivors invested less in real estate from the 
beginning, experienced the peak but retreated from this peak more quickly 
than failures.  
 Rodkey, a professor of banking and investments writing in 1933, 
warned against pre-depression excesses, and in particular against 
excessive investment in real estate mortgages which are “notoriously 
unliquid [sic]” (Rodkey, 1933, p. 120). In particular, he pointed to many 
banks’ flawed assumption that the investment of savings deposits (or time 
deposits) in such assets was justified because of the further assumption 
that time deposits were a “permanent fund under control of the banking 
system” (ibid.). He reminded these bankers that during a depression 
savings depositors withdraw “not only their current interest but also their 
principal” (ibid.). As Figure 8 shows, during the 1920s, the banks that 
invested the most in real estate actually also had the highest ratio of real 
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estate to time deposits, which shows that earlier failures misbehaved even 
according to their own (flawed) assumptions.24  
 
Figure 8: Real Estate Loans to Time Deposits, Four Cohorts (Excluding 
the all Depression Cohort). 
 
 
Source: Statement. 
  
 Another important indication of risky management is the bank’s 
share of asset reserves, both primary and secondary. Primary reserves 
include all cash items, including cash balances at other banks. Secondary 
reserves are earning assets of the highest quality and earliest maturity 
(usually one year or less). These include open-market commercial paper 
of the highest quality but also (and especially) short-term government 
bonds, which can quickly be converted into cash in an emergency. Figure 
9 shows banks’ reserve-deposit ratio, which includes primary reserves 
and government bonds. Figure 10 shows in more detail the composition of 
the bond portfolio: the share of total bonds and stocks invested in 
government bonds. 
                                                     
24 The depression spike is very likely due to a substantial fall in time deposits. 
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Figure 9: The Reserve to Total Deposits Deposit Ratio 
(Includes, Cash, Other Cash Resources, Due From Other Banks 
and US Government Investments).  
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
Figure 10: US Treasury Bills to Total Bonds and Stocks.  
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
 The first thing to notice in Figure 9 is the general fall in the reserve-
deposit ratio over the 1920s, for all cohorts. Without analysing it in detail, 
Guglielmo (forthcoming) showed a comparable graph which did not 
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differentiate between survivors and failures. But this graph also shows 
that survivors almost always had a higher reserve-deposit ratio during the 
1920s. As a side note, the rise for survivors during the depression shows 
to what extent their deposits could fall without making them fail. This 
graph nonetheless shows fewer differences between the various cohorts 
as Figures 6-8 did. The June 1933 ratio varied to a greater extent than 
those of the other two failing cohorts. The earliest failures did not seem to 
be worse off than later failures. Figure 10 shows larger gaps: although for 
survivors investments in US governments fell over the 1920s, their share 
was almost constantly four times larger than for June 1932 failures (and 
such was already the case in December 1923). Initially the earliest failures 
had a larger share than June 1932 failures, but the gap was almost 
reduced to nothing around December 1928 as they both declined. This 
tends to suggest that these failures took part more suddenly and more 
quickly in the stock market boom around that time. At this point late 
failures are very close to survivors, so that one can see a divergence 
between survivors and late failures on the one hand, and middle and early 
failures on the other. This confirms Rodkey’s statement that “Failure to 
maintain adequate secondary reserves is probably the most common fault 
in American banking” (Rodkey, 1933, p. 159). One should note that with 
such a low share of US governments when entering the depression, the 
Federal Reserve would have found it difficult to bail out these banks had 
such been its desire. Such was not the case with survivors.  
There are two notable issues concerning bonds and stocks. The 
first one is that, as Rodkey deplored, financial statements do not provide 
any information as to whether bonds are carried at, below, or above 
market prices. The other issue is that there is no information either on the 
maturity of US governments (which are not always short-term), and on the 
composition of “other bonds and stocks.” Past authors have insisted on 
the development of bond investment for real estate. A study by Rodkey on 
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Michigan bank failures shows that 42% of their bond account was 
composed of real estate and construction bonds in December 1928, “a 
class of securities, which, under no circumstances, meet the fundamental 
tests of either soundness or liquidity” (Rodkey, 1933, p. 101). Another 
source gives only 23% for Chicago investment banks at this point, 
although it shows an increase of this percentage in 1925 to 37.5% 
(Bureau of Business Research, 1931), as opposed to 23.6% in industrial 
issues.25 
In addition, the financial statements provide data on investment in 
fixed assets, especially in the form of bank premises and other real estate. 
Since the latter will be studied in the next section, Figure 11 gives the 
proportion of “banking house” (“banking house, furniture and fixtures”) to 
total capital.  
 
Figure 11: Banking House, Furniture and Fixtures to Total Capital. 
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 As its name indicates, this ratio represents the share of investment 
in the bank building and salaries. A large share is usually considered 
                                                     
25 More discussion on real estate bonds in Part III.  
 
 
 
42
excessive. If one ignores the 1926 spike for the June 1933 cohort,26 the 
same pattern as in the other four graphs is apparent. Early failures always 
invested more in this type of asset, mid-depression failures invested 
slightly less, and survivors even less. Again, the difference is visible from 
the start of the time series. There was a peak in investment for early 
failures and survivors around December 1925, with little variation after this 
date until the depression. This is additional evidence of long-term risky 
behaviour among early and mid-depression failures.  
 Finally, a word of caution. One important variable for this pre-
depression period has not been mentioned: the total capital to total assets 
ratio, as shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: Total Capital (Capital Stock + Surplus + Undivided Profits) to 
Total Assets.  
 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
 This graph would tend to suggest that the capital ratio is not a major 
cause of failure or survival. Although survivors had a higher ratio during 
                                                     
26 This spike for the June 1933 cohort is perhaps due to the unusual fall in sample size 
at that time from 14 to 9 banks as mentioned in section 2a. In other graphs this spike 
appears also for June 1931 failures, probably for the same reason.   
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the 1920s than June 1932 and June 1933 exclusive failures, early failure 
had an even higher one. This weak correlation between the capital ratio 
and the time of failure is confirmed by many authors, who on average 
simply do not report this ratio in their analysis, or find it insignificant 
(White, 1984, Thomas, 1935, Esbitt, 1986, Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 
2003, Guglielmo, forthcoming).  
 
b) 1928-1933 
 If one looks again at the preceding graphs, this time focusing on the 
depression, it will be seen that the variables studied are not the best 
variables for measuring increasing distress.  The ratio of real estate to 
assets changes as assets start falling (and assets themselves cannot be 
studied separately since they’re an indication of size). Ratios including 
deposits are interesting at this time mostly because they reflect deposit 
losses, which again cannot be studied individually because of the size 
bias. The behaviour of US governments to total bonds and stocks during 
the depression was commented upon above. Finally, banking house 
expenditure is not highly relevant to a depression era. Fortunately, there 
are three other variables which can be studied and which turn out to be 
crucial for the depression-era analysis. 
 The first one is well-known as a measure of bank profitability, 
nowadays called retained earnings to net worth.27 It is the ratio of retained 
earnings to total capital, and on 1929 financial statements the former 
category comes out as “undivided profits” or “the volume of recognised 
accumulated profits which have not yet been paid out in dividends” 
(Rodkey, 1944, p. 108; see also Van Hoose, 2010, p. 12). Figure 13 
shows this ratio from 1923 to 1933. 
 
 
                                                     
27 See Hefferman (1996), Guglielmo (forthcoming), Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2003).  
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Figure 13: Ratio of Retained Earnings to Net Worth (Undivided Profits to 
Total Capital). 
 
 
Source: Statements 
  
Note, first of all, that most cohorts’ total capital starts declining in 
1929 or 1930, which means that a decline in the retained earnings to net 
worth ratio is not due to this factor.28 As in the previous section, the usual 
pattern is visible, with a higher ratio for survivors, a slightly lower ratio for 
late failures, and so on, from 1923-4 onwards. However Figure 13 is 
particularly interesting for the study of the depression itself. First, 
survivors’ ratio starts falling later and more smoothly than all three other 
cohorts (in December 1930). By December 1930 the latter had already 
started to fall quite abruptly. The two late failures cohorts had started 
falling by June 1930, which can thus be identified as a turning point for 
these two cohorts. The early failures’ ratio only really falls in December 
1930, but it seems to have been particularly low for a long time, especially 
                                                     
28 See Figure 3 for the trends in total capital, and recall that the “all depression” curve 
should not be taken for granted. 
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since December 1928 when it decreased substantially. Equally interesting 
is the fact that the top three cohorts’ ratios peak in June 1926 (the first two 
will peak again around 1929), thereby showing a possible link between 
the peak in real estate and the peak in retained earnings. Both the June 
1933 and June 1932 failures experience quite a sharp fall from 1926 
onwards, only to rise again around the stock market boom. The June 
1932 cohort ratio, in particular, rises by less during the stock market boom 
than during the real estate boom, as if it had started on its way down as 
early as June 1926, recovered briefly around October 1929 and then 
resumed its decline. Thus, this graph gives strong support to the 
argument that early failures became particularly vulnerable in terms of 
profitability even before the depression began, and that mid-depression 
and late failures started their decline before December 1930 (in June 
1930), and even before that if we consider the mid-twenties peak.  
 Another telling variable for Chicago failures is that of “other real 
estate.” Other real estate is an asset consisting of property repossessed 
by the bank in the face of real estate foreclosures. It is usually recognised 
by bankers as an undesirable asset and held only to minimize loan losses. 
As Rodkey indicated: 
 
 “Such holdings are (...) an indication of deficiency in earning 
power on the part of the borrower and a resulting market 
value of the property insufficient to cover the face of the 
mortgage. Such other real estate can be disposed of only at 
a loss to the bank, and this loss is likely to be considerable if 
it must be disposed of in order to provide additional liquid 
funds” (Rodkey, 1944, p. 127).  
 
This variable should then be one of those variables representing a 
backfire effect of real estate investment in the 1920s (given the collapse in 
real estate, discussed in Part III). Figure 14 shows precisely this.  
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Figure 14: Other Real Estate to Total Assets. 
 
Source: Statements. 
 
First, I should point out that the graph showing other real estate as 
an absolute value is almost the same, meaning that the effect of total 
assets on the ratio is negligible (probably due to the very small share of 
“other real estate” compared to other assets). Again, the usual pattern 
appears, although not so much in the 1920s since foreclosures only 
started to rise later on. The most striking feature of this graph is the 
coincidence of time of failure and time of rise in other real estate. The 
earliest failures’ ratio started to rise as early as December 1928 (see 
footnote 26 on the 1926 peak), the mid-depression failures’ starts rising in 
June 1930 (so before December 1930), and the later failures’ starts rising 
about the same time as survivors’, in December 1930 and June 1931. But 
the late failures’ ratio rose more abruptly than that of survivors, which may 
partly explain their failure. Thus, at least for early and mid-depression 
failures, turning points are again identifiable before the end of 1930, that 
is, in June 1930 and December 1928.  
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 Finally, I take a look at bills payable and rediscounts, a form of 
long-term, high interest debt, which is a good indicator of deposit 
withdrawals (but better than deposit withdrawals themselves since it is a 
ratio). This is due to the fact that when deposits are withdrawn from risky 
banks, they are forced to rely on high-cost, borrowed debt (Calomiris and 
Mason, 1997). Figure 15 shows the ratio for all four cohorts.  
 
Figure 15: Bills Payable and Rediscounts to Total Assets. 
 
Note: for this ratio variations in total assets again have little effect. 
Source: Statements. 
 
This graph shows banks’ race for liquidity as they started losing 
deposits.  Therefore, it is not surprising that for all banks the ratio only 
starts rising very late, and thus is not a good indicator a fundamental 
vulnerability. Nevertheless, it can still be seen that just as the depression 
started (around June and December 1929) early and mid-depression 
failures saw their ratio rise higher than usual, even before the massive 
withdrawals. This would tend to suggest that they were already identified 
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by the public as being less healthy, or simply that they already lacked 
liquidity for some other reason. As a side note, the June 1932 spike for 
survivors and late failures may be due to a Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) plan to inject liquidity in banks that it thought sound 
during the June 1932 crisis (Calomiris and Mason, 1997).29 
 To conclude, the evidence presented in Part II demonstrates the 
importance of 1920s long-term trends to explain the timing of failure 
during the depression: overall, earlier failures had been relying on more 
risky assets from as soon as December 1923. The earlier the failure, the 
riskier its behaviour had been in the 1920s. Moreover, turning points in 
bank vulnerability indicators are easily identifiable often as soon as the 
depression started (or even slightly before), which is especially true for 
early and mid-depression failures. In sum, the correlation between time of 
failure and both 1920s and in-depression variables gives strong support to 
the idea that long-term behaviour caused an increase in the vulnerability 
of banks at the start of the depression. 
  
 
3. The Chicago Banking Landscape in the 1920s 
Introduction 
The aim of this part is to provide background qualitative (and 
sometimes quantitative) information on the 1920s Chicago banking 
landscape. Although some work has already been done in this direction 
by a number of authors, my aim is to shed light on the current state of 
knowledge while filling some gaps in the modern literature with reference 
to depression-era sources (Rodkey, 1935; 1944; Fisher, 1928; Hoyt, 
1933; James, 1938; Simpson, 1933; Morton, 1944). Despite failing to 
                                                     
29 As Calomiris and Mason (1997) remind readers, “it is important to keep in mind that 
the RFC was the only entity charged with helping avoid the insolvency of individual 
banks. At this time, Federal Reserve Banks did not view the prevention of bank 
insolvency as their mandate.” 
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rigorously analyze the impact of 1920s trends on bank failures, many 
economic historians have felt the need to look into that decade’s 
regulatory and credit environment to provide some qualitative 
explanations of bank distress. For example, a number of them focused on 
the issue of branch banking prohibition as a possible cause of failure 
(Wheelock, 1995, Mitchener, 2003, Gambs, 1977, Carlson and Mitchener, 
2006, Carlson, 2004, Calomiris and Wheelock, 1995). Others have looked 
more generally into credit booms (Robbins, 1934, Minsky 1986, 
Kindleberger, 1978, Galbraith, 1972, Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2003) 
and more particularly the real estate boom (White, 2009, and Guglielmo, 
forthcoming). The literature on the regulatory environment (and especially 
on branch banking in Illinois) is substantial and will be summarized briefly 
in the first section. The second section focuses on the Chicago credit 
boom fueled by a combined business and population boom. The modern 
literature for the 1920s on this topic is thin compared to the number of 
studies of Chicago in the depression, which may be precisely due to a 
lack of rigorous analysis of urban banking in this era.30 Nevertheless, 
there is a sizeable contemporary literature, often from land economics. I 
should note that the issue of the representativeness of 1920s Chicago 
with respect to the rest of the US goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, and it will only be discussed briefly in some places.  
 
3.1. The Regulatory Environment 
 “Chicago state banks had the highest failure rate of any urban area 
in the country during the Great Depression” (Guglielmo, forthcoming). 
Moreover, they had a higher failure rate than the rest of the state of Illinois 
                                                     
30 The literature on rural banking is significantly larger since many failures in the 1920s 
occurred in rural areas. See Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) and Alston (1983). 
According to the former, “rural banks were twice as likely to fail as urban banks” in the 
1920s.  
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(ibid.), a fact which goes against the common assumption that urban 
banks are more able to diversify their portfolio than rural ones.  
 One reason why this was the case may be the prohibition of branch 
banking in the whole state of Illinois. The main reason branch-banking is 
usually thought of as an advantage is that it allows portfolio diversification. 
For instance, Chicago banks are known to have invested substantially in 
office building and other urban real estate. It is therefore plausible that if 
these city banks had owned branches in the countryside they would have 
been able to diversify their loan and bond portfolios into agricultural loans 
(ibid.). According to Guglielmo, states that allowed branching had an 
average state bank failure rate of 34%, compared to 40% for states that 
had no branches at all. Of course, these figures hide the particularities of 
the different states, which may have had a higher failure rate for reasons 
independent of branch-banking prohibition. Although differences between 
the two types of states cannot have been very large, they are still 
noteworthy. 
 Branch banking can be contrasted to group or chain-banking as 
branches of the same bank can pool their assets and liabilities together. 
This is not true in the case of chain banking whereby different banks are 
affiliated through “interlocking directorates, common officers, or common 
stock ownership,” and thus keep separate their assets and liabilities 
(ibid.). In case there is a liquidity shortage at one of the banks in the 
chain, other member banks cannot simply transfer funds to that bank for 
help, a problem which does not even arise in the branch-banking system. 
This may partly explain the collapse of the Bain chain in June 1931 which 
triggered the banking crisis at that time (James, 1938, p. 994). However, 
many bankers still feared that if branch-banking was authorized a few of 
the largest banks of Chicago would monopolize the market in the whole 
state of Illinois. Thus it is in great part the activism of the Illinois Bankers’ 
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Association which led to the official prohibition of branch-banking in Illinois 
in 1923 (ibid., p. 955).  
 The lack of portfolio diversification was not necessarily directly due 
to the unit-banking system. Indeed, Rodkey points to the fact that many 
small bankers prior to the depression felt a moral duty to “meet all 
demands for good local loans” (Rodkey, 1944, p. 4). Moreover, it seems 
that the lack of portfolio diversification was not the only disadvantage of 
unit-banking. Rodkey blamed this system for fostering the incompetence 
of bank managers:  
 
 “This system leads naturally to a multiplicity of small banks 
under local control, owned locally, and operated usually by 
citizens of the home community who may or may not have 
some knowledge of the fundamental principles of sound 
banking” (Rodkey, 1935, p. 147).  
 
Thus, by triggering the establishment of many small banks, unit-banking 
made it easier for inexperienced bankers to become managers.  
 Nevertheless, the debate on branch-banking has not completely 
ended. So far, at least four studies have shown that the branch-banking 
system was detrimental to bank survival during the depression. While 
Calomiris and Wheelock (1995) concede that it has usually been a good 
thing in U.S. history, they find that such was not the case in the Great 
Depression. Some of the largest branching networks collapsed in the 
1930s, which may have been due to a form of moral hazard: branching 
banks thought they were better protected against local risk, and thus were 
less careful with their asset management (see also Carlson, 2001). 
Calomiris and Mason (2003) confirm the negative effect of branch-
banking, and so does Carlson (2004). On the other hand, Mitchener 
(2003) finds a positive effect, while Gambs (1977) finds no effect at all.  
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 Finally, a word on general supervision. Financial regulation in the 
1920s and at the time of the depression was extremely lax, and Illinois 
was one of the states with the most lax legislation (Guglielmo, 
forthcoming). Despite having set a capital requirement of $25,000 (which 
was quite high compared to other states), nothing ensured that banks 
followed this requirement in Illinois. And indeed, in June 1929 90% of 
state banks did not (ibid.). Also, the state was more or less silent 
regarding reserve requirements. Moreover, Rodkey deplored the 
competition between state banking departments and the federal 
Government for granting charters to promoters of new banks. This race to 
the bottom resulted in “laxity in the granting of new charters” and a 
“difficulty of limiting such charters to competent persons” (Rodkey, 1935, 
p. 147). Many states also “failed to recognize how vitally important the 
functions of bank examiners really [were]:”  
 
 “The niggardly salaries paid to examiners lead to a large 
turnover in the examining staff. Men leave the staff while still 
young and thus have no opportunity to develop the essential 
qualities which have been described. As a matter of fact, it is 
customary to look upon a place on the examining staff of 
most states, not as a life position, but merely as a stepping-
stone to the vice-presidency of some particular bank” (ibid., 
p. 160). 
 
In such conditions, one can understand that credit in the 1920s could 
flourish in all sorts of ways, which is the topic of the next section. 
 
3.2. The Economic and Population Boom: the Expansion of Credit 
Part II demonstrated that failing banks had been particularly 
reckless during the 1920s, especially in real estate, although the data do 
not allow one to see the evolution of the composition of other investments 
in detail (for example, public utilities versus industrial loans). Guglielmo 
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(forthcoming) gives information on the real estate boom but remains silent 
on the general economic boom. Moreover, he fails to assess the role of 
government in the real estate boom, and does not mention the role of life 
insurance companies and savings and loan associations, which had an 
important role in the increase in competition for credit agreements. This 
section attempts to bring all this information together with respect to 
Chicago. 
 
a) The General Economic Boom 
 In the 1920s the US experienced a significant general business 
boom, which affected urban centres in particular (Hoyt, 1933, p. 235). 
Chicago was particularly well placed at the time because it lay next to 
large agricultural areas which experienced serious trouble after World War 
I. Indeed, Hoyt shows how both the return of soldiers and sailors and the 
coinciding fall in the price of foodstuffs during the 1920-21 crisis were 
conducive to the great expansion of Chicago both demographically and 
economically. The business and population boom fed on itself as workers 
were attracted by the higher wages of the city, including many black 
people from the South (ibid.).31 Figure 16 shows how the Chicago 
population increased by almost one half from 1918 to 1927. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 In fact, the two largest banks in the U.S. operated and owned by black people were in 
Chicago: the Douglass National Bank and Binga State Bank (James, 1938, p. 955).  
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Figure 16: Population Growth in Chicago. 
 
 
Source: Hoyt (1933, p. 483). 
 
 The excitement that the progress in economic activity and the near-
constant arrival of new dwellers (at least in the first half of the 1920s) 
brought to the city led to an extremely fast development of credit, termed 
“financial elephantiasis” by a contemporary (James, 1938, p. 939). 
Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) rigorously emphasize the interaction 
between the structure of the financial sector and the business boom. In 
particular, they show how the development of a market for consumer 
durables affected the expansion of credit: as vacuum cleaners, audio 
equipment and kitchen appliances appeared in department stores, 
consumers started to look for instalment purchase options. The rapid 
growth of instalment credit first started with nonbank institutions. For 
example, in 1919 General Motors established the General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) to finance the development of its mass 
market in motor vehicles. However, very quickly many sorts of financial 
institutions ended up competing for consumers’ credit. Moreover, the rise 
of new technologies contributed to the expansion of the financial sector as 
it led to unusual investor enthusiasm for their commercial potential and 
profitability. By the end of the 1920s “1,500 finance companies competed 
with commercial banks for a toehold in the market” (ibid.).  
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 The importance of competition for the credit boom is a non-
negligible issue. As will be seen in the next sub-section (on real estate), 
commercial banks competed with savings and loan associations as well 
as life insurance companies to offer mortgages. The negative effects of 
competition are often implied in the literature on branch-banking, and 
current literature on the topic in general is substantial.32 Excessive 
competition can promote excessive risk-taking, which was one reason 
why the post-depression Glass-Steagall Act introduced deposit rate 
ceilings (Van Hoose, 2010, p. 127).  It may also lead to instability due to 
the “monkey-see-monkey do” mechanism: “if a rival extends a loan to the 
prospective borrower, the bank raises its estimate of the probability of 
project success for that borrower, thus creating a herding effect” (Ogura, 
2006). However, other authors such as Carlson and Mitchener (2006) 
have shown that competition in the long run could lead to the exit of weak 
banks and a subsequent increase in stability. As Van Hoose makes clear, 
the evidence on the topic is “at best mixed” (Van Hoose, 2010, p. 129), 
but the issue should be seriously considered as a possible destabilizing 
effect of the 1920s credit boom.  
 
b) Real Estate 
The credit expansion in Chicago translated also in a substantial 
building boom, which may have been particularly strong in the Chicago 
area, although so far there has been no major academic study on 1920s 
real estate activity at a disaggregated level for the country as a whole.33 
There is outstanding evidence that the Chicago real estate boom was 
excessive in the sense that it reflected predictions of population increases 
                                                     
32 See, in particular, Van Hoose (2010) for a good literature review on the topic, pp. 
126-9.  
33 White (2009) studies the question for the country as a whole but does not 
disaggregate into the various regions and cities of the US. For a journalistic account 
see Sakolski (1932).  
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that went far beyond the actual increase. Hoyt posits that it is because 
Chicago’s population started growing at an unusually rapid rate that 
investors imagined that a “new era” was born and that Chicago would 
have grown up to 18 million by 1974.34 In 1928, Ernest Fisher, associate 
professor of real estate at the University of Michigan, studied real estate 
subdividing activity and found that “periods of intense subdividing activity 
almost always force the ratio of lots to population considerably above the 
typical” (Fisher, 1928, p. 3). His explanation was that “the only basis for 
decision is the position of the market at the time the manufacturer [makes] 
his plans,” which leads to procyclicality. In real-estate prediction no room 
was made for a future slowdown in population growth. As can be seen in 
Figure 16, such a slowdown occurred in 1928, just before the start of the 
depression. To Hoyt, “the [real estate] cycle [was] generated largely by a 
sudden and unexpected increase in population, which was in turn due to a 
rush to take advantage of economic opportunities” (Hoyt, 1933, p. 403).  
Figure 17 shows how the Chicago building boom reached a peak in 
1925 and then receded abruptly. Figure 18 shows the ratio of new 
residents per new building from 1915 to 1930.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
34 Hoyt humorously depicts “distinguished scholars’” assessments of the situation, 
which were often quite surprising (Hoyt, 1933, p. 388).  
35 This graph was made from data from Hoyt (1933, pp. 378, 475), but was presented 
for the first time by Guglielmo (2000).  
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Figure 17: Annual Amount of New Buildings in Chicago. 
 
        
Source: Hoyt (1933, p. 475).  
 
Figure 18: New Residents per new Building in Chicago. 
 
 
Sources: Hoyt (1933, pp. 378, 475) and Guglielmo (forthcoming).  
 
Clearly, these graphs show the widening gap between new building 
construction (which is planned in advance of population increase) and 
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actual population arrival. There is a small rise in new residents per new 
building from 1922 to 1924, but even at the construction peak (1925) the 
ratio has already started going down. There is a short recovery in 1927, 
but an abrupt fall afterwards.  Figure 19 shows the sharp rise and fall in 
the number of acres subdivided in the 1920s. As for new buildings, the fall 
is much sharper than the actual population slowdown, which shows the 
sudden realization of excess construction. Figure 20 shows a similar 
picture for the value of new construction in Chicago, which started falling 
in 1927 and entered a freefall in 1928 and 1929.  
 
Figure 19: Number of Acres Subdivided Annually in the 1931 Limits of 
Chicago. 
 
 
Source: Hoyt (1933, p. 479). 
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Figure 20: Annual Value of New Construction in Chicago (dollars). 
 
 
Source: Hoyt (1933, p. 475).  
 
The rise in construction was certainly helped by large extensions of 
credit. As companies switched from debt to equity financing, banks 
switched from investment in the more secure short-term commercial loans 
to riskier investments such as real estate and the stock market (Rodkey, 
1944, p. 4). At the same time, the rise in the Chicago population also 
attracted bankers directly, so that most of the outlying Chicago banks 
created in the 1920s “were the outgrowths of the real estate boom” 
(James, 1938, p. 953). Promoters of real estate found that a bank was an 
“invaluable accessory” as it provided the funds necessary to finance a 
project while at the same time lending to the purchaser a substantial 
portion of the price. James concludes: “their soundness was intimately 
related to the building boom” (ibid.). Tables 6a and 6b show the rise in 
number and size of nonfarm mortgages for commercial banks competing 
with savings and loan associations and life insurance companies.  
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Tables 6a and 6b: Size of Nonfarm Mortgage Loans 1920-29, by Period 
Loan Made (dollar figures in thousands). 
 
1- to 4- Family Homes 
Life insurance 
companies Commercial Banks 
Savings & Loan 
Association Period 
made No. of 
Loans Av. Size 
No. of 
Loans Av. Size 
No. of 
Loans Av. Size 
1920-24 851 $4.4 714 $3.9 551 $2.7 
1925-29 2061 5.4 1097 4.6 859 3 
 
All Other Companies 
Life insurance 
companies Commercial Banks
Savings & Loan 
Association Period 
made No. of 
Loans Av. Size
No. of 
Loans Av. Size
No. of 
Loans Av. Size
1920-24 118 $47.5 86 $33.7 67 $4.4 
1925-29 239 70.1 160 20.4 86 4.9 
 
Source: Morton, 1956, p. 48 
 
Loans on real estate were not usually fully amortized, and were 
thus called “balloon” mortgages. White (2009) argues that this feature of 
the mortgage market, together with the prevailing low loan to value ratio 
(usually 50%), guaranteed the safety of these loans. However, Morton 
(the main source for quantitative information on 1920s real-estate lending) 
saw these balloon mortgages as particularly hazardous: “It was because 
of statutory restrictions that the practice grew of taking what reduction 
could be obtained in a mortgage loan at its maturity and then remaking it 
for another short span of years. (…) The debacle of the thirties proved 
beyond question that they were inadequate (…)” (Morton, 1956, p. 8). In 
addition, little attention was given to the ability of the borrower to meet his 
interest payments (Rodkey, 1935, p. 122). Consequently, while the 
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contract maturity between 1925 and 1929 was 3.7 years, the realized 
contract maturity became 8.8 years (ibid., p. 119, and Guglielmo, 
forthcoming).  
Moreover, Hoyt emphasizes the wide impact of “shoestring” 
financing at the time which “swelled the number of new structures.” Very 
little capital was needed to erect a skyscraper (Hoyt, 1933, p. 383): 
 
“Contractors (…) sometimes made an agreement to purchase 
a lot, put up a small deposit on the purchase price, drew 
plans for an elaborate structure, and on this basis secured a 
loan large enough to pay the balance due on the lot and to 
complete the building. Again several large Loop office 
buildings, such as the one at the southwest corner of Clark 
and Madison streets (…) were erected by parties who 
secured a ground lease and who virtually without any capital 
succeeded in securing a loan on a bond issue sufficient to 
erect a skyscraper” (ibid., p. 386).  
 
Municipal governments often also took part in the general 
enthusiasm. Simpson (1933) gives examples of city officials and local 
municipalities having “a large order of sewer pipe (intended for the regular 
city streets) hauled out and spilled along the streets of a new subdivision, 
left there over the week-end to give an appearance of immediate activity, 
and then gathered up by the city trucks and hauled back to its original 
destination.” 
  Finally, the vast supply of funds in the 1920s was tapped by the 
sale of real estate bonds. According to Hoyt, such sales were greatly 
helped by the fact that the public had become familiar with bonds in 
general since the Liberty Loans campaign during World War I (Hoyt, 1933, 
p. 383). Large mortgages were split into bonds of denomination as low as 
one hundred dollars, which “vastly widened the market” (ibid.). Moreover, 
as a selling technique, banks promised to repurchase such securities from 
 
 
 
62
dissatisfied customers, and they thus started to dangerously accumulate 
in their portfolios after 1925.  
 In sum, all these elements taken together may well explain the 
patterns described in Figure 14, which shows the sharp rise in banks’ 
“other real estate” towards the end of the 1920s. Whether it is the most 
important cause of the financial breakdown in Chicago or simply a 
contributing factor is a subject for further debate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Many authors had previously succeeded in showing the 
vulnerability of banks prior to their failure in the Great Depression. This 
dissertation showed when Chicago failures started to act in a more risky 
way and when their vulnerability became more acute. It also 
demonstrated that the time of failure coincided with a bank’s risky 
behaviour in the 1920s on the one hand, and with earlier or deeper 
vulnerability after 1928 on the other. In particular, throughout the 1920s 
June 1931 failures had a higher real estate loan share than June 1932 
failures, and June 1932 failures had a higher share than June 1933 
failures. This was true for almost all other relevant variables, whether it be 
real estate to time deposits, the reserve-deposit ratio, US government 
bonds to total bonds and stocks or banking house to total assets. For the 
Great Depression era a turning point in banks’ vulnerability is identifiable 
before December 1930 at least for early and mid-depression failures. Late 
(June 1933) failures tend to behave more like survivors. June 1930 is 
singled out as a critical point for June 1932 failures both in terms of 
retained earnings and other real estate. For earlier failures, the downturn 
started even earlier, sometimes as early as December 1928 (especially in 
other real estate), or December 1929 (for bills payable and rediscounts). 
For most cohorts retained earnings peaked around June 1926, sometimes 
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never going back to this level (at least for the June 1932 cohort). This 
tends to confirm an important role for real estate activity in 1920s in 
depression Chicago, on which the last part gave quantitative and 
anecdotal detail. Although bank size was a non-negligible aspect of failure 
rates, the analysis of financial ratios shows that this was certainly not the 
main one. 
 The issue of the representativeness of the Chicago population of 
state banks has only been hinted at here and there throughout the thesis, 
but it is an important one. In order to truly be able to assess, for example, 
the role of real estate in long-term bank behaviour one would have to 
compare the findings on Chicago with the rest of the country. This is of 
course a laborious task and would require that the data used here (and 
more) be available for the country as a whole, which is far from evident. 
Nevertheless, future research on the topic would be of great interest. 
Moreover, I have only applied mainly graphic analysis to an extremely 
complex problem, and other forms of analysis, perhaps more rigorous 
ones, should certainly be tried out. Finally, one thing that has not been 
done in this study is a comparison of the results of a similar analysis for 
the banks that failed throughout the 1920s with the current one (for 
depression failures). This would facilitate a test of the idea that depression 
failures differed from 1920s failures.     
 Overall, the dissertation has given shape and emphasis to the 
theory that banks during the Great Depression failed not because of 
sudden liquidity problems but because of fundamental weaknesses. It 
would be difficult, in light of the evidence presented here, to still argue that 
the main causes of bank failure were “autonomous liquidity shocks” due to 
a “contagion of fear.” 
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